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Heritage in Indian Nation-Building
Brian Hole
India is a large and extremely diverse multination state that is constantly faced
with the challenge of maintaining its unity. In the past two decades the Hindu
nationalist movement has become a significant factor in Indian politics, and
has systematically leveraged heritage to create communal tensions. This has
resulted in short-term political gain, but is also tied to longer-term goals of
establishing a homogenously Hindu state in South Asia. This article argues that
instead of being in decline, this movement is actually progressively expanding,
and that the case of Ayodhya is only one part of a much larger programme in
which heritage academics play a significant role, and that their collective
actions will be pivotal to the future stability of the country.
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Introduction
There is an assumption behind most nationalist theories of India that as a concept
it is indivisible, and that while highly diverse it is nonetheless comprised of
sufficient unifying factors to naturally function as an autonomous whole (Prakash
1992, p. 360). This is also the view of Amartya Sen, who stresses a long history of
tolerance of diversity, leading to a naturally secular state (Sen 2005, p. 17). Time
and again throughout the world’s history, however, the divergent will of various
ethnic groups has proved unstoppable. This was recognized by Rabindranath
Tagore, who in 1917 described the greatest challenge for India as being:
. . . the problem of the world in miniature. India is too vast in its area and too
diverse in its races. It is many countries packed in one geographical recepta-
cle . . . India . . . being naturally many, yet adventitiously one, has all along suffered
from the looseness of its diversity and the feebleness of its unity. A true unity is
like a round globe; it rolls on, carrying its burden easily. But diversity is a many-
cornered thing which has to be dragged and pushed with full force. (Tagore 1917,
p. 124)
It is too narrow a view to say that the Indian state is able to achieve stability
principally through a secular approach, with which it is able to define and
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 2013
Vol. 7, No. 2, 196222, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2012.714244
# 2013 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
work is properly cited. The moral rights of the named author(s) have been asserted.
maintain the idea of a single nation and from which it then derives its legitimacy.
In reality, as noted by Tagore, much ‘dragging and pushing’ of various elements of
the population is required in order to achieve this. While stemming mainly from
Europe in the early twentieth century, the ideas of Hannah Arendt provide a
useful lens with which to view and interpret the mechanism of nation-building
in India.
According to Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism, mechanisms inherent to
the nation-state ensure that national minorities not fitting its strict and coherent
vision of ‘the nation’ are effectively relegated to a ‘stateless’ condition (Arendt
1951, p. 290, Butler and Spivak 2007, p. 31). Such minorities enter what Arendt,
in The Human Condition, terms the private as opposed to the public world; they
are effectively neither able to participate in the politics of the state, nor to fully
receive protection from it (Arendt 1958, p. 221). This is essentially an alternative
strategy to pure secularism, which enables the state to manage a very diverse
population by making it politically less so. I contend that in the case of India,
while a serious attempt at a secular state has been made on the surface, Arendt’s
ideas more closely describe the actual mechanisms that the state has effectively
deployed to this end since independence. This is, however, a delicate situation,
as Arendt recognized in The Origins of Totalitarianism:
The great danger arising from the existence of people forced to live outside the
common world is that they are thrown back, in the midst of civilisation, on their
natural givenness, on their mere differentiation. (Arendt 1951, p. 302)
In cases where a majority religious identity comes to dominate government and
the pretence of secularism is dropped (as is progressively happening), this could
mean that stateless communities would come to view themselves as separate
nations along ethnoreligious lines. None of the possible outcomes of such
situations, for example repression, expulsion or secession, are likely to occur
non-violently, or without affecting the stability of both the state and those
neighbouring it. Over time, any change to the approach that India and groups
within it take to secular governance and nation-building may well have an impact
upon its ability to maintain order among its national minority groups, and
ultimately upon its very integrity.
I would like to advance the argument that the use and interpretation of
heritage plays a highly significant role in this process, and will thus directly help
to determine the future form of the Indian nation-state. To do this, this article
looks at how concepts of an Indian nation have arisen, and at the state of Indian
nationalism today. This is followed by a review of how heritage academics
(archaeologists and historians) have been involved with nationalist theories and
movements and what their impact has been. Importantly, this review draws
together a range of recent events that have not been clearly linked in other
studies. Looking then to the future, the potential for Indian archaeology to
counter right-wing nationalism is assessed, along with the potential internal and
international consequences if it does not choose this path.
A MANY-CORNERED THING 197
Nationalism and Heritage
The concept of India as a single territory goes back possibly as far as the third
century BC, with the Maurya Empire (Kulke and Rothermund 2004, p. 61). Since
then, many other kingdoms and empires have occupied a large part of the same
area, including the Chalukyas, the Vijayanagara Empire, the Delhi Sultanate and
the Mughal Empire. Despite being territorially unified under the British, the
Government of India Act 1935 created separate electorates based on religion,
creating the conditions for the rise of sectarian nationalism and eventually
leading to partition in 1947, a policy aptly described as ‘divide and leave’ (Thakur
1993, p. 647).
The India that emerged from partition fits Kymlicka’s terminology of a
‘multination state’ made up of ‘national minorities’, which he defines as
‘. . . the coexistence within a given state of more than one nation, where
‘‘nation’’ means a historical community, more or less institutionally complete,
occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture’
(Kymlicka 1995, p. 11). As Kymlicka points out, such states can only survive if
each national minority both has an allegiance to the greater political community
of the multination state, and, at the very least, they ‘. . . view themselves for
some purposes as a single people’ (Kymlicka 1995, p. 13). These were the
questions being asked of the new citizens of India in 1947.
As when Massimo D’Azeglio in 1861 had said that ‘We have made Italy. Now we
must make the Italians’ (Beales and Biagni 1971, p. 3), so the new generation of
Indian leaders were now faced with the same challenge. Writing of his youth in
1946, Jawaharal Nehru explained that the middle class he belonged to were very
much the product of the British system and its views, which they now sought to
challenge:
New forces arose that drove us to the masses in the villages, and for the first
time, a new and different India rose up before the young intellectuals who had
almost forgotten its existence, or attached little importance to it. It was a
disturbing site, not only because of its stark misery and the magnitude of its
problems, but because it began to upset some of our values and conclusions. So
began for us the discovery of India as it was . . . (Nehru 1946, p. 50)
Describing the conclusions he came to about Indian identity, he wrote that:
I was also fully aware of the diversities and diversions of Indian life, of classes,
castes, religions, races, different degrees of cultural development. Yet I think
that a country with a long cultural background and a common outlook on life
develops a spirit that is peculiar to it and that is impressed upon all its children,
however much they may differ among themselves. (Nehru 1946, p. 52)
Serving as India’s first prime minister from 194764, Nehru pursued a vision of
a secular Indian state that would not be bound by class stratification (Sen 2005,
p. 204). In order to achieve this, religion was explicitly excluded as an
organizational factor, and there was to be no one official national language,
198 HOLE
despite the dominance of Hindi. The Indian states were reorganized according to
language in 1963, which Brass has described as the ‘most successful and balanced
nationality policy which has been pursued in either India or the Soviet Union’
(Brass 1991, p. 314).
Following Nehru’s death, it was during the three terms that Indira Gandhi
served as prime minister between 1966 and 1984 that sectarian nationalism once
more began to take hold in India. Indira Gandhi pursued interventionist policies
designed to eliminate state governments run by rival parties, often appealing to
voters on the basis of religious issues. This was one of the causes of an increase in
sectarian violence and the rise of secessionist movements in Assam, Kashmir,
Mizoram, Nagaland and the Punjab (Brass 1991, p. 318). Eventually this became
her downfall, and she was assassinated in retaliation for putting down a Sikh
separatist movement in the Punjab that she had helped to create.
In particular, her concessions to conservative Muslim demands had the effect
of strengthening right-wing Hindu claims that despite government pretences of
secularism, Muslims were receiving preferential treatment. The main party to
benefit from this was the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which went from only two
seats in the Lok Sabha (lower house of the parliament) in 1984 to 85 seats in 1989.
The BHP is the political party of the Hindu nationalist movement, also referred to
as Hindutva or the Sangh Parivar. Other organizations that fit under this umbrella
are the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Council of Hindus, VHP) and the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (National Self-Help Association, RSS).
These policies were largely continued by Rajiv Gandhi, culminating in the Shao
Bano case in 1987, in which the government amended the constitution to
specifically deny Muslim women rights to maintenance support following divorce,
which until then had been granted to all other Indian women. This was seen as ‘a
watershed event’ by the BJP, which galvanized popular Hindu sentiment against
what was perceived as Muslim fanaticism (Ludden 2005, p. 225).
Thus, by the start of the 1990s the policies of India’s government had drifted
some way from those of secularism and equality under Nehru. With the VHP
and BHP on the rise, a coordinated programme of right-wing Hindu policies and
propaganda was ready to be deployed, in which nationalist claims to heritage
have played a significant role.
India has been known for its archaeological heritage since the earliest days of
the discipline, with Palaeolithic artefacts having been discovered as early as 1863
in Chennai (Chakrabarti 2006, p. 1). Numerous travellers and British officials had
reported on the archaeological richness of India, but it was however the discovery
of the Indus civilization by Pandit Daya Ram Sanhi in 1920 that first made a major
difference to Indian perceptions of their own past in national terms:
. . . the discovery of the Indus civilization made India a respected member of the
small number of lands that gave birth to true civilized life. In India, at least, the
discipline of archaeology has served the country well, allowing it to take its
rightful place as one of the oldest and most interesting regions of human
endeavour. (Paddayya 1995, p. 143)
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With partition in 1947 the main Indus sites of Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro became
part of Pakistan, so Indian archaeologists’ attention was quickly focussed on
finding further examples of the civilization within their new borders in order not
to lose this distinction. At the same time, Indian historians began to write their
own works, which naturally tended to be anti-colonial in nature, with the aim of
refuting British claims that India had always been a diverse collection of ethnic
groups that could only be governed as a whole by outsiders, and that any
evidence of a highly developed civilization was the result of external influences.
In order to portray the past as more indigenous, homogenous and independent,
the new historians sought to show that it originated with an essentially Hindu
culture. They continued to work with the periods defined by the British,
emphasizing that the Indian nation had begun with a golden age of Hinduism, and
then later been oppressed and exploited by the Muslims and the British. While this
began as an anti-colonial stance, it was also to become a great support for Hindu
nationalists, and as Prakash (1992, p. 360) points out, this perspective ‘. . . had and
continues to have deadly implications for a multiethnic country such as India’.
From independence onwards the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) and a
growing number of Indian university archaeology departments have produced a
large body of excellent, scientifically balanced work that has greatly enriched
our knowledge of the highly diverse, common history and prehistory of South
Asia, a point that will be taken up again later in this article. At the same time
however, various actors with more narrow nationalist aims have taken a much
more selective and exclusive approach. While they are a minority, their voices
are often heard the loudest because their well-publicized claims are aimed to
coincide with major political or communal issues of the day, and being highly
emotive, they often create ‘facts’ that go unscrutinized by the wider public,
what Prakash has termed ‘worlding the Third World’ (1992, p. 382).
As often follows the gaining of independence, the first targets were the
immediately departed British, with many prominent colonial monuments being
demolished (Rao 1994, p. 154). Another symbol of an earlier colonial period, the
Somanatha temple in Gujarat had been destroyed in the eleventh century in a
raid by the Muslim Mahmud of Ghazni. In 1951 its ruins were cleared despite the
protests of historians and archaeologists, and a new temple was built as a
statement of freedom from foreign rule. This was a nationalist project,
undertaken in order to celebrate the founding of a new and predominantly
Hindu state, and for this reason it was strongly opposed by Nehru:
While it is easy to understand a certain measure of public support in this venture,
we have to remember that we must not do anything that comes in the way of our
State being secular . . . There, are, unfortunately, many communal tendencies at
work in India today and we have to be on our guard against them. It is important
that Governments should keep the secular and non-communal ideal always
before them. (quoted in Thapar 2004, pp. 189190)
Despite Nehru’s opposition, the communal focus on the past began to grow, with
the main antagonist being the Hindutva movement. A central facet of Hindu
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nationalism is to portray India as culturally homogenous (i.e. Hindu), whereby
anyone or anything that does not fit this definition is cast as illegitimate and
inferior. Many strategies involving heritage have been employed to achieve this,
including attempting to claim the earliest occupation of the sub-continent,
attacking ‘illegitimate’ heritage sites and defending Hindu ones, misrepresenting
the history of cultural interaction, and attempting to misinform the public
through the media and school textbooks. We will look at each of these
approaches in turn, both in terms of how they have been achieved, and what
impact they have had on the stability of the Indian nation-state.
The most well known example of nationalist heritage destruction in India is
that of Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh, but this has been a major catalyst for similar
events in other parts of India as well, and examples will be given from Gujarat,
Maharashtra and Karnataka.
Ayodhya is a town in the Faizabad district of Uttar Pradesh, with a population
of around 75,000. Although identified today with the mythical city of the same
name in the great epic poem the Ramayana, research has shown that the modern
Ayodhya was given its name in the fifth century by the Gupta king Skanda Gupta,
in order to gain political prestige (Gopal et al. 1990, p. 77). Since around the
middle of the nineteenth century, a belief had begun to spread among some
Hindus that the Babri Masjid (mosque) in Ayodhya had been built on top of a
temple to the god Rama, on the very spot of his birth. In 1949 a group of local
Hindus broke into the mosque and deposited Hindu idols, at which point the local
magistrate had the mosque locked and made unavailable for worship. The
situation remained tense but mostly uneventful for the next 30 years.
During this time, several archaeological investigations of Ayodhya and the
surrounding area were made, including one in the 1970s by the eminent
archaeologist B.B. Lal very near to the Babri Masjid, which uncovered little
more than what appeared to be a section of a fortification (Lal 197677, p. 52),
rousing little interest. This is significant, as Lal was dedicated to searching for
evidence of the Ramayana epic, and as such would not simply ignore the
potential discovery of one of its major locations.
By the 1980s the uneasy tension that had prevailed at the site was finally
ignited by the communal tensions being stirred up by Indira Gandhi’s adminis-
tration, and in 1984 a movement known as the Ram Janmabhumi (Birthplace of
Rama) campaign was started, with the aim of claiming the site for Hindus. This
was supported by the VHP and the RSS, and received a major boost when the BJP
decided to actively support it in order to broaden their popularity. The decision
to politicize the association of the mosque with Rama is not a random one. As
Pollock (1993, p. 282) has noted, the Ramayana is a text that involves significant
‘demonization of the other’, and is therefore very suitable for stirring up
communal tensions. This is something that the BJP has actively played upon, even
producing travelling theatrical productions in which the BJP as Rama fights
against rival parties in the form of the menacing and immoral Ravanna (Gillan
2003, p. 385). In 1985 the campaign began to demand that the mosque be
demolished and a new temple to Rama be built in its place.
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As Lal’s earlier excavations of the site had provided no evidence to support the
temple claims, the VHP archaeologists proceeded to manufacture it. Suddenly, in
a right-wing Hindu magazine, Lal remembered having discovered what he
considered to be burnt brick pillar bases during the excavations, though he had
not considered this worth publishing at the time. These were now taken as
evidence that a columned temple had once stood on the site. Later independent
analysis of photographs of the trench in which Lal claimed to have found the
pillar bases found that they were actually the remains of various walls of
different, non-contemporaneous structural phases, and could not have been
load-bearing structures (Mandal 2003). Despite this, Lal had made the following
statement at a conference in 1988:
It is abundantly clear there did exist a twelfth-century temple at the site, which
was destroyed and some parts incorporated in the body of the Babri Masjid. (Lal
2001, p. 119)
Despite his adamant position, other than one photograph, Lal has never made
the notebooks and sketches of his excavation available to other scholars so that
his interpretation could be tested (Sharma 2001, p. 132), and has not come
forward and testified in court at any point. Instead, he later wrote that the
evidence was ‘so eloquent that no further comments are necessary’ (Lal 2008,
p. 68). It is difficult to accept Lal’s explanation of events and not come to the
conclusion that the structural elements he had previously thought insignificant
suddenly became temple foundations only in order to manufacture support for
the nationalists’ cause.
By 1990 the situation had become so hotly contested that the national
government set up a commission of enquiry to determine once and for all
whether a Hindu temple had ever been demolished in Ayodhya to build the
mosque. To answer this question authoritatively, a subcommittee was formed of
historians and archaeologists, half nominated by the VHP and half by the Muslim
Babri Masjid Action Committee or BMAC (Rao 2006, p. 82).
In February 1992 the BJP decided that it had waited long enough, and by
including the rebuilding of the supposed Hindu temple in its election manifesto,
and with a BJP government now also in control of Uttar Pradesh, the fate of the
Babri Masjid was effectively sealed. By July 1991 land had been acquired around
the mosque, and preparation of the surrounding area for construction began. In
June of 1992, these levelling activities led to the discovery by VHP workmen of a
large pit filled with stone sculptures three metres below the surface, which were
claimed to have come from a Hindu temple (Sharma et al. 1992, p. 1), and an
area of walls and brick floors, claimed to be from a very large structure pre-
dating Islamic occupation, which had clearly been demolished (Sharma et al.
1992, p. 11), almost too perfectly proving the temple destruction theory. The big
problem with these new discoveries was that they were not excavated by
archaeologists, so their stratigraphic and cultural contexts were not recorded,
they were never properly documented and many of the objects have never
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actually been seen by anyone else. Independently analysing the information
available on the stone sculptures, Mandal concluded that they could not be dated
to the period of the postulated temple because their stratigraphic locations were
not recorded, and the wide range of weathering patterns on the various objects
indicated that they actually came from a range of locations and periods (Mandal
2003, p. 45).
The final meeting of VHP and BMAC historians and archaeologists took place on
5 December 1992. Against a background of over 100,000 VHP kar sevaks (holy
volunteers) converging on Ayodhya, BMAC protested that this made the meeting
pointless, and it broke up because relations between the two sides had become
too hostile (Rao 2006, p. 99). On 6 December the kar sevaks, ignoring security
forces, stormed the Masjid and within hours it had been totally demolished and
Hindu idols were placed on the site (Rao 2006, p. 156), an event that sparked off
communal violence in which over 2,000 people were killed.
In the days following the demolition, the national press reported that large
stone objects and other remains indicative of a Hindu temple had been recovered
from below the mosque, as though these were archaeological fact. As Ratnagar
has commented (2003, p. 70): ‘. . . they have gone so far as to claim that an act of
mob violence and the destruction of a five-century old structure amount to a
valid retrieval of archaeological evidence!’
In 2002, the ASI was instructed by a High Court order to investigate the site
once more, in order to definitively answer the question of whether a temple had
once been demolished below the mosque. The site was then excavated by the ASI
over a six-month period in 2003. Independent observers of the excavations
reported that correct archaeological standards and procedures were not followed
(Mandal and Ratnagar 2007, p. 29). In the end, the report concluded only that a
‘huge structure’ had been located, which had been dated to the eleventh
twelfth century, and indirectly insinuated that this was a temple. Once again,
independent analysis of the excavation report and methods concluded that there
was no logic in this conclusion, and that there was no evidence of demolition in
the sixteenth century, ‘but of vandalism in the twentieth century’ (Mandal and
Ratnagar 2007, pp. 129131). Essentially, the ASI report was seen as a whitewash
aimed at supporting Hindutva claims behind a pretence of scientific objectivity:
‘The rhetoric of finding proof through archaeology offers means of foreclosing
dissent by invoking the authority of performing ‘‘science’’’ (Guha 2005, p. 422).
By allowing events to get to the stage where the mosque was destroyed, and then
by allowing the ASI to produce a heavily biased report, the Indian government
clearly no longer stood so firmly behind Nehru’s ‘secular and non-communal
ideal’.
Because events surrounding the Ayodhya demolition were so explosive and had
so much news coverage, outside of India one could be forgiven for believing it to
be a unique, if disturbing, occurrence. This is not the case however, and other
Indian heritage sites have in turn become the targets of right-wing nationalism,
following the lead of events in Ayodhya.
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Since its founding in 1964, the VHP had created a long list of sites (mostly
mosques) in India that they believed had either been built over Hindu temples
(Brass 1995, p. 241), or were offensive to Hindus in some other way. Hindu
nationalists also worked to prepare the public by deliberately misrepresenting
the number of cases where Hindu temples had been destroyed in order for
mosques to be built in the past. B.B. Lal has written of ‘hundreds of examples, all
over the country’ (Lal 2008, p. 66), while Goel lists over 2,000 Muslim monuments
that he claims ‘stand on the site and/or are built from materials of deliberately
demolished Hindu temples’ (Goel 1990, p. 62), as a result of ‘large scale
destruction’ by ‘Islamised invaders’ (Goel 1990, p. vii). The numbers have been
further inflated to 30,000 temples in the political rhetoric of VHP leader Pravin
Togadia (Mahaprashasta 2009). These assertations have been refuted by Eaton,
who shows that temple destruction was very seldom for religious purposes but
was rather a facet of statebuilding, whereby it was part of the process of erasing
the authority of a defeated Hindu ruler, and was also practiced in HinduHindu
conflict (Eaton 2000, pp. 104107). He is only able to identify 80 known cases of
temple desecration between 1192 and 1760 (Eaton 2000, pp. 128131).
This is essentially a process of deliberately planting fake historical facts and
memories in the minds of the public, and unfortunately the Hindutva message has
been repeated much more frequently than it has been refuted in the media. A
result of this is that many kar sevaks have pledged to reclaim thousands of sites
(Bayley 1993, p. 12); all that is needed is for the right degree of communal
tension to exist and any of the sites on the VHP list could fall victim.
This is what happened in Gujarat on 27 February 2002 when a large group of
VHP kar sevaks were returning by train from Ayodhya where they had been
continuing to agitate for a temple to be built on the now levelled site. There had
been a series of communal clashes between the kar sevaks and Muslims as they
travelled through the town of Godhra, and a rumour spread that they had
kidnapped two Muslim women, causing the emergency brake on the train to be
pulled. A mob of angry Muslims attacked the carriage that the activists were
riding in and it was set alight*within an hour 59 people from the train were dead
(Swami 2002). Over the next month, communal violence flared in the state, with
an official death toll of 850, unofficially estimated to be as high as 2000 (Human
Rights Watch 2002, p. 4).
During this period of communal violence religious and cultural heritage sites
were also systematically targeted, with 298 dargahs, 205 mosques, 17 temples
and three churches being either damaged or destroyed within two months
(Pandey 2002). This was a carefully planned and well-resourced operation:
The famous 500-year-old masjid in Isanpur, which was an ASI monument, was
destroyed with the help of cranes and bulldozers. The famous Urdu Poet Wali
Gujarati’s dargah was also razed to the ground at Shahibaug in Ahmedabad. While
a hanuman [a Hindu god] shrine was built over its debris initially, all that was
removed overnight and the plot was [paved] and merged with the adjoining road.
(Chenoy et al. 2002)
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These are not the only nationalist events related to heritage that have
occurred in Gujarat since Ayodhya.The state has had a BJP government since
1995, and the Chief Minister, Narendra Modi, is notorious for stirring up
communal conflict. In such a climate, right-wing nationalism continues to be
directed at heritage, with even an important World Heritage Site under threat.
Located in ever-volatile Godhra, Champaner-Pavagadh Archaeological Park
received World Heritage status in 2004. An important aspect of the site is that
it contains a mixture of Hindu and Muslim elements, and as an early Islamic, pre-
Mughal city it exhibits a unique blend and transition between the two traditions
(UNESCO 2004, p. 28). Almost all of the Muslim families living at Champaner left
following the 2002 riots (Sreenivas 2004), and the Gujarat government upset the
Islamic Relief Committee in 2004 by producing brochures for the annual Navratri
festival which listed all of the monuments in the park other than the Muslim
shrines (Sreenivas 2004). The state government is attempting to promote the
multicultural nature of the region in a belated attempt to look good despite its
complicity in the 2002 riots, but such omissions still occur and, especially,
syncretic places of worship are ignored, as these contradict the Hindutva notion
of a natural state of conflict between the religions. The situation has also been
greatly exacerbated by a local BJP politician. Complaining that the site
showcases more Muslim monuments than Hindu ones, and leveraging community
dissatisfaction with building restrictions, he has begun agitating to have World
Heritage status removed from the site (Khan 2007), a move that is feared would
lead to a loss of protection for the site, and the eventual destruction of the
Muslim sections of it (Abdi 2007). At the same time, in nearby Vadodara the
authorities have recently displayed open disregard for Muslim heritage during
road construction by destroying part of a medieval Muslim graveyard containing
the grave of a prominent Sufi, on the grounds that it was ‘encroaching on public
land’ (Westcoat 2007, p. 59).
Even highly prominent politicians in Gujarat have been active in asserting a
Hindu ownership of the past. For example, in 2003, while he was state Minister
for Science and Technology, Murli Manohar Joshi claimed evidence of a 9,500-
year-old Hindu civilization had been discovered in the Gulf of Cambay (Venkatesh
and Radhakrishna 2003). So far his discovery has only received support from
Graham Hancock and received no further attention, but it demonstrates the
nationalist leaning of Modi’s government.
Karnataka is another state in which the methods of leveraging heritage as a
communal issue used at Ayodhya have been redeployed. In this case, a Sufi shrine
in the Western Ghats, the Guru Dattatreya Baba Budangiri Swamy dargah, is
already being compared to the Babri Masjid in the media. Although controlled by
Muslims, the shrine is syncretic in nature and is also used by Hindu worshippers of
an incarnation of Shiva known as Dattatreya who have been peaceably allowed
joint access to the shrine for their rituals for centuries. The VHP has been
campaigning to ‘liberate’ the shrine for several years, and in 2003 the BJP
ominously became involved, with local party leaders going so far as to publicly
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state that they intended to turn the issue into ‘another Ayodhya’, and vowing to
‘repeat Gujarat’ (Srikanth 2003).
The strategy employed at Ayodhya has been carefully replicated here, with
Hindutva propaganda attempting to win over the media and popular opinion.
As in Ayodhya, where the Babri Masjid came to be known more popularly as
‘Ramjanambhoomi’, so the shrine’s historical Muslim name of ‘Bababudangiri’ is
being replaced with the Hindu ‘Dattareya Peeta’ (Taneja 2006). In order to
further stoke local tensions, kar sevaks have been brought in from across the
country for rallies, with one annually timed to coincide provocatively with the 6
December demolition of the Babri Masjid (Srikanth 2003). The political nature of
the movement is more than apparent in the way that things flare up most in the
run-up to elections, and while Karnataka is currently between these things seem
relatively quiet. Many expect things to come to a head eventually though: ‘The
silence is eerie, however, and with a BJP government in power, pregnant’
(Srinivasaraju 2009). The first signs of this happening may be recent moves by the
BJP to renovate the site according to Hindu requirements, in full contravention
of a Supreme Court order (Sayeed 2009).
Activists in Maharashtra have also sought to follow the Ayodhya model, as
during the lead up to an election campaign in the town of Pratapgarh in 2004.
Targeting the tomb of the seventeenth-century Muslim general Afzal Khan, the
VHP organized a protest against buildings being built around the site by the
Muslim charitable trust that manages the site. With kar sevaks brought in from
other areas, around 1,200 protesters marched towards the site, encouraged by
inflammatory rhetoric, with one local BJP leader for example being quoted as
saying ‘. . . Why is the government supporting a trust which looks after an enemy’s
tomb?’ (Katakam 2004). The protest turned violent when finally stopped by
police and in the end 250 people were arrested. While the official aim was to
remove ‘illegal’ structures around the tomb, there can be little doubt as to what
would have happened without police intervention, as stated by one VHP member:
‘. . . We would have done it with our own hands, like Babri Masjid, what did we
have then in our hands?’ (Menon 2004).
Despite the fact that the above events in Gujarat, Karnataka and Maharashtra
all represent a clear continuation of Hindutva tactics deployed in Ayodhya, it has
in recent years become common to hear that the right-wing threat posed by the
BJP and Hindutva has been greatly lessened for the foreseeable future. This is
largely based on the fact that, once in power, the BJP adopted more centrist
policies, for example by withdrawing its calls for the building of a temple at
Ayodhya. The fact that it then also lost the federal elections in 2004 was seen as
demonstrating a change of heart by the electorate following the Gujarat riots,
which would force the party to maintain a more moderate stance if it were to
stand a chance of re-election in the future. All indicators, however, point towards
this move to the centre as being a matter of temporary expediency only, and that
in fact the right-wing agenda is still being pursued with determination and
mounting momentum.
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The issues which led to the BJP being voted out of power have not been
resolved by that action. Most obviously, those responsible for the destruction of
the Babri Masjid, for the ensuing violence and for the later Gujarat riots have
never been brought to justice, and there are thus large numbers of right-wing
sympathizers who know through experience that they can take the law into their
own hands without the threat of punishment, and can be called upon again in
future. The real effects of the BJP’s time in power can be expected to continue
for a long time to come, as during this period the influence of Hindutva became
deeply embedded in many state institutions. Thus, while the BJP itself appears
on the back foot, the RSS itself has actually been expanding due to this
foundation (Times of India 2009a). The continued trajectory of the Sang Parivar
has been demonstrated by elements within it being linked to recent terrorist
attacks, such as those in Goa in 2009.
In the meantime, Hindutva politics, currently deemed inexpedient for the BJP,
are being expressed outside of it. For example, the former Chief Minister of Uttar
Pradesh, Kalyan Singh (who was head of the state government when the Ayodhya
demolition took place), has recently started his own right-wing party, ‘that will
espouse the ideology of Hindutva, cultural nationalism, social justice, social
harmony and development’ (Indian Express 2009). The BJP itself has in turn
continued to stir communal tensions when absolutely necessary to keep things on
track, such as by briefly promoting the Ayodhya temple project in the hopes of
influencing the recent Allahabad High Court verdict.
The greatest evidence that the ideology of Hindutva has become internalized
by the state is the way that the Ayodhya case has been handled. Determining final
responsibility for the events at Ayodhya was assigned to a commission, which
then took 17 years (including 48 extensions) to produce a report that was finally
submitted to the government in June of 2009 (Times of India 2009b). This was
followed by a judgement of the Allahabad High Court in September of 2010,
which determined that the site should be divided into three parts among Hindus,
the Nirmohl Akhara Hindu sect and Muslims. The judges accepted the ASI report,
completely ignoring all evidence to the contrary that had been submitted by
independent parties:
The disputed structure was constructed on the site of the old structure after
demolition of the same. The Archaeological Survey of India has proved that the
structure was a massive Hindu religious structure. (Sharma 2010)
They also accepted the Hindutva view that the site is the birthplace of Ram:
The area covered under the central dome of the disputed structure is the
birthplace of Lord Rama as per faith and belief of Hindus. (Agarwal 2010)
While the above ruling is certain to be taken to the Supreme Court by one or
more of the parties, it is already certain to have wide-reaching consequences.
Writing in 2003, Kesavan predicted that were such a verdict to be delivered, then
‘imperceptibly, India would become another country’ (Kesavan 2003, p. 67), and
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this may turn out to be an understatement. A legal precedent has now been set
by which the religious beliefs of one community have been seen as sufficient in
order to claim land from another group. The result of this will surely be a massive
increase in the number of claims being made by Hindu groups throughout India. It
will also greatly embolden Hindu nationalists overall, as was shown by immediate
demands being made by the BJP that the Muslims relinquish their one-third share
of the Ayodhya site.
In parallel to these events at major sites, the philosophy of Hindutva has also
been systematically promoted within academia, with many scholars advancing
nationalist theories arguing for indigenous origins of Hindu culture. At the centre
of these theories is the Aryan race issue, where it is not so much the case that
‘. . . nothing less than the origin of Indian civilization is at stake’ (Danino 2003,
p. 21), but that nothing less than the ownership of Indian civilization is. The idea
of an ‘Aryan’ heritage in India goes back to the research of Max Mu¨ller, who had
proposed a homeland in Central Asia for the Aryans, who then spread to Europe
and South Asia in two separate migrations, and introduced Vedic or Hindu culture
to India (Mu¨ller 1883). In part, this theory has a strong attraction for Hindu
nationalists, as claiming Hindu and Aryan culture to be the same thing effectively
separates Hindus from all other people in India. The idea that the Aryans were
invaders however is strongly refuted, as this would reduce the strength of claims
to indigeneity, placing Hindus in the same category as Muslims and Christians as
immigrants. The preferred version of the Aryan theory improves Hindu self-
esteem and legitimizes the social status of upper-caste Hindus, and it also installs
Hindus as ‘the inheritors of the land since the beginning of History’ (Thapar 2000,
p. 15), and all others as alien. At the extreme, in the same way that Nazi
treatment of the Jews was ‘theoretically excused’ through creating the
distinction of Aryans and Semites, so now the mistreatment and exclusion of
other groups in India*e.g. Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and tribal peoples*is also
excused (Thapar 1996, p. 10).
One strategy employed in establishing this position is to identify Hindus with
the earliest known advanced culture in India, the Indus civilization, which is best
known for the sites of Harappa and Mohenjo-daro. By claiming continuity of a
Vedic culture from the Indus civilization to modern Hinduism, essentially a
‘foundational myth’ (Guha 2005, p. 418), any share of this prestige is denied to
other groups in India. Archaeologists have become involved in this in a number of
ways. Often this involves making a wide range of comparisons of what is known of
Indus culture to aspects of modern Hindu culture, seeking similarities such
as methods of farming, arts and crafts and household items, and using examples
from vastly different geographical locations and timescales to make arguments
which are both tenuous yet at the same time difficult to refute (Guha 2005,
p. 415). The theories ignore the fact that even without full continuity these
aspects of culture are naturally diffusive and would have been picked up by
neighbouring groups through trade and intermingling anyway. The fact that many
of the tribal cultures in India as well as those of neighbouring regions seem to
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have retained aspects of Indus-like material culture with greater fidelity is
conveniently ignored (Thapar 1996, p. 21).
Many methods have been used in attempts to prove the Vedic character of the
Indus civilization. These have included attempting to demonstrate the presence
of horses in the latter by Jha and Rajaram (2000), later demonstrated to have
been achieved through computer manipulation of images on Indus seals (Witzel
and Farmer 2000, p. 6). Well over a thousand publications on the Indus symbols
have been published (Possehl 1996, p. 76), along with over 50 decipherment
attempts (Misra 1992, p. 12), most of which aim to prove that the symbols
represent Sanskrit language. This is despite solid linguistic and archaeological
work demonstrating late Vedic did not appear until two millennia after the height
of the Indus civilization, and that the symbol system is more likely ‘a relatively
simple system of religious-political signs that could be reinterpreted in any
language’ (Farmer et al. 2004, p. 45). B.B. Lal has in turn tried to make up for the
lack of physical evidence for written language by arguing that two small pieces of
terracotta with no markings on them are highly likely to be writing tablets, based
on a comparison with the wooden takhıs used until recently in Indian schools (Lal
2002, p. 135).
Hindutva scholars have also aimed to prove that the Saraswati river,
mentioned throughout the Rigveda, was in fact located in India., with B.B. Lal
making the case, based on two verses of the epic poem, that it must actually
have flowed through India and right past the famous Indus civilization site of
Mohenjo-daro on its way out to the Arabian Sea (Lal 2002, p. 15). Once again Lal
is willing to overstate the importance of weak evidence, in this case by claiming
that the Rigveda is a source of incontrovertible evidence, and he defends the
position by labelling any who disagree as (anti-Hindu) bigots: ‘Can we afford to
ignore the categorical evidence provided by these two adjacent verses?
Surely not, unless we blindfold ourselves under a spell of bigotry’ (Lal 2002,
p. 11; the bold type is Lal’s). The theory nevertheless gained official sanction
under a BJP-led government in 2003 with the creation of the Saraswati Heritage
Project, which was given a huge budget and placed under the ASI (Guha 2005,
p. 418). However, once the BJP was out of power the new government carried out
a review of the ASI’s work, and in 2006 the Parliamentary Standing Committee on
Transport, Tourism and Culture reported that the ASI had failed to follow correct
processes in choosing sites for excavation. Pointing out that the project was
extremely pro-Hindu, they stated regret that so many resources had so far been
used ‘. . . just to excavate a mythological river whereas, several other monu-
ments/heritage sites of national importance are languishing due to acute
shortage of funds’, and the budget for the project was subsequently slashed
(Chhibber 2006). Similarly to many commentators on Ayodhya, the committee
expressed serious concern that right-wing considerations had led members of the
ASI to compromise the scientific integrity of the project:
The ASI is the custodian of the rich cultural heritage and as such its role to
safeguard the cultural fabric of the country is of crucial national importance.
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Therefore, the committee reiterates that before undertaking any excavation of
any such mythological projects like the Saraswati Heritage Project, the ASI
should make proper scientific and technical appraisal and no extraneous factors
should go into the decision-making. (Chhibber 2006)
Tellingly, the number of works thus seeking to prove an indigenous origin for
Hindu culture has grown in parallel to the BJP and the Ayodhya movement,
openly seeking to reinforce a popular political paradigm, rather than through any
direct relation to newly discovered evidence.
In addition to the academic world, the Hindutva perspective is also being
pushed within the Indian education system. While the BJP was in power between
1998 and 2004, the National Council of Educational Research and Training
(NCERT) produced new history textbooks for schools that contained ‘appropriate
rewritings’, and deleted many sections from earlier ones. Similarly, the Indian
Council of Historical Research (ICHR) was ‘overhauled’ and given a new
agenda and staff in line with nationalist priorities (Sen 2005, p. 63). A major
aspect of this was once again the focus on Hindu cultural continuity*the Indus
civilization was renamed the ‘Indus-Saraswati Civilization’ in textbooks, and
developments in mathematics, philosophy and science were given much earlier,
Vedic origins:
Such untruths have been the staple diet upon which the cadre of the Sangh
Parivar has been brought up. But then, to introduce such false statements into
the school curriculum is indeed a dangerous proposition. The havoc that
indifferent scholarship combining with a distorting ideology could cause in school
education is all too apparent. (The Hindu 2002)
Most of these changes were reversed when the BJP lost its majority in the
national elections, and the new NCERT textbooks have for the most part been
highly regarded. There have been some cases where the same issues continue
however, such as the class 11 textbook Ancient India by Makkhan Lal, which still
contained over 137 historically incorrect assertions and errors (Habib et al. 2003,
pp. 2757). The Hindu bias in the curriculum also continues in BJP-ruled states
such as Himachal Pradesh, where, for example, a chapter on the Muslim painter
M.F. Husain (who had controversially portrayed Hindu goddesses in the nude) has
been removed from textbooks (Phull 2010).
When Hindu nationalist content was removed from the national school
programme, other ways to influence children’s education were sought. For
example, the BJP had increased the amount of Sanskrit and Vedic literature
taught in schools, which was then reduced again once they lost power in favour of
a more multicultural curriculum. The response of Hindutva was to establish
Sanskrit summer camps. In a Washington Post article, an interview with a
19-year-old camp attendee confirmed the success of the scheme: ‘. . . when
I study Sanskrit, I learn who I am. It is my identity’ (Lakshmi 2008).
The aim of shaping education to conform to Hindutva ideology is not being
limited to India. During a review of textbooks to be used in Californian sixth grade
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classes in 2006, several US organizations, including the Hindu Education
Foundation, demanded changes to sections of the textbooks that did not show
Hinduism in a positive light, or that discussed theories of an Aryan migration into
India rather than cultural continuity of Vedic culture (Baldauf 2006). The
situation went to court, with the Hindutva claims eventually being thrown out
in June of 2009 (Walsh 2009). Several expatriate organizations have also become
extremely vigilant in defending conservative Hindu interests in the United
Kingdom. M.F. Hussain was again the target when the two groups known as the
Hindu Forum of Britiain and Hindu Human Rights forced an exhibition of his works
in London to close in 2006, with protests that threatened to turn violent. This
followed a 2005 campaign that forced the Royal Mail to withdraw a Christmas
stamp featuring a Hindu family, which was claimed to be culturally insensitive
(Zavos 2008).
As can be seen from the examples listed above, an overall aim of Hindu
nationalism is to create a large body of literature that emphasizes the continuity
of Hindu culture in India from the earliest times, and denigrates the contribution
of other cultures. It is as if once this body of work is in place, it will be possible to
simply ignore the work and claims to the contrary of mainstream heritage
academics. This is something that Possehl (1996, p. 168) has noted in regard to
decipherment research on the Indus symbol system, where while not all, but
much of the work is following a nationalist agenda: ‘. . . researchers barrel ahead
in their own directions, showing little evidence that they can, or even care to,
draw on the work of their colleagues’. Thapar (2000, p. 16) has commented
on the same thing: ‘Dogmatic assertions with no space for alternative ideas often
arise from a sense of inferiority and the fear of debate. Hence the determination
to prevent the publication of volumes on history which do not conform to
Hindutva ideology.’ Often researchers who work within frameworks and models
that are established within their disciplines, and with the consensus of
international colleagues, are described as neo-colonialists, elitists, hypocrites,
right-wing Christians, bigots and extremists, without seriously attempting to
rebut their academic arguments. This can also turn violent, as in January of 2004
when protests against a book by US academic James Laine on the eighteenth-
century Hindu ruler Shivaji ended with the storming of the Bhandarkar Oriental
Research Institute in Pune. Hindu activists ransacked the archives, destroying and
damaging hundreds of rare manuscripts in retaliation for the institute having
allowed Laine to conduct research there, forcing Oxford University Press to
withdraw the book from the Indian market (Suroor 2004) and the Maharashtra
state government to ban it completely, until the Supreme Court finally lifted the
ban in 2010 (Times of India 2010).
There is considerable concern within mainstream Indian archaeology about the
activities of these fringe nationalist researchers, who often come from unrelated
backgrounds and yet publish prolifically on archaeological and historical ‘facts’
that back up Hindu nationalist agendas. This was summarized by D.P. Agarwal in
his address to a major Indian archaeology conference at the start of the new
millennium:
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I would like to express my fears about the neophyte archaeologists. With these
newly converted friends of Indian archaeology, it does not need any enemies.
Their over-zealous but misinformed efforts are not only befuddling the issues,
but are diverting the efforts in the wrong directions. (Agarwal 2000, p. 15)
Discussing the divisions in the discipline over Ayodhya, Paddayya highlights one
possible outcome of this problem:
India’s past and its students, instead of serving as a source of enlightenment for
society, have become a burden on it. It is not unreasonable that the ordinary
citizen has now started expressing doubts about the relevance of both to society.
(Paddayya 1995, p. 141)
While many do not believe that archaeology, history and the sciences can ever
offset the ‘irrational anger’ and ‘wrath of the people’ when stirred by communal
politics as in the case of Ayodhya (Rao 1994, p. 161), the potential of the
situation to seriously escalate should not be forgotten. This was well described by
Kymlicka in Multicultural Citizenship:
. . . the fear is that group-differentiated rights will undermine the sense of shared
civic identity that holds a liberal society together. These rights will be a source of
disunity that could lead to the dissolution of the country, or, less drastically, to a
reduced willingness to make the mutual sacrifices and accommodations
necessary for a functioning democracy. (Kymlicka 1995, p. 173)
This is the ultimate danger posed by the Hindutva movement and its attempts to
appropriate the Indian past, that in their attempts to create a unified Hindu
nation-state, they may in fact eventually bring about the collapse of an already
fragile and fractious arrangement.
Both local and international heritage academics have not only the ability but
also a vital responsibility to redress the misrepresentation of the past for political
means in India. Research carried out with the aim of gaining a clear under-
standing of the highly diverse and interwoven roles that all groups living in South
Asia have played as part of their common history has the potential to offset right-
wing nationalist misinformation, and to assist in creating a higher level of
cohesion between the various national minorities of the Indian nation-state.
There are many areas in which there is great potential for this to be achieved.
The prehistory of South Asia is as yet relatively poorly understood compared to
other parts of the world (Chakrabarti 2006, p. 474). By filling in the details,
archaeologists have the opportunity to emphasize what is (at least until now)
uncontestedly common to the heritage of everyone in the region, and to uncover
the important role that it has played alongside neighbouring regions in the history
of humankind overall. The potential for the study of Middle Pleistocene hominins
is greater in India than anywhere else in the Old World (Dennel 2009, p. 336), and
research into the Siwalik region as a possible migratory corridor for Homo erectus
could provide pivotal evidence regarding the competing ‘Out of Africa’ and
multiregional development models in human evolutionary studies (Chakrabarti
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2006, p. 477). India also offers an ability to look more deeply into prehistory than
many other regions. The site of Bhimbetka in Madhya Pradesh, for example,
possesses petroglyphs dating back three times further than any discovered
elsewhere in the world (Chakrabarti 2006, p. 478), and this uniqueness combined
with a rich ethnographic record of hunter gatherer societies (Dennel 2009,
p. 336) means that there is enormous potential to gain much greater insight into
human societies from the paleolithic onwards. In the words of Kennedy, a long-
term researcher in South Asian paleoanthropology: ‘. . . we are at the threshold of
an exciting era in the history of science as India takes its rightful place in our
understanding of human evolution’ (Kennedy 2005, p. 40).
As can be seen from the section earlier in this article, the way in which
evidence of the Indus civilization is interpreted is key to whether it can be co-
opted by the Hindu right. While it is going to be extremely important to continue
rebutting unfounded claims made by right-wing researchers, it will also be crucial
to continue with investigations that unravel the true nature of this ancient
culture. Intriguingly, there are indications from current research that the Indus
civilization, covering an enormous geographic area, may actually have incorpo-
rated multiple national minorities and languages, and yet still managed to
maintain its unity and cohesiveness over a very long period of time (Farmer et al.
2004, pp. 4445). The potential contributions of this to building a modern Indian
national identity based on unity in diversity are obvious. Taking a more
multidisciplinary approach to Indus research would not only greatly increase
the range of information available to answer the larger questions (Shinde et al.
2006, p. 71), but it would also help to refute the claims of some right-wing
nationalist researchers that the archaeological approach is too narrow and
dogmatic.
It is also important that the syncretic history of many Indian sites be brought to
the attention of students and the public, emphasizing the fact that Hinduism,
Islam and other religions have not only existed peacefully together but have even
shared their very places of worship, completely in opposition to the concept of
periods of singular usage broken by violent transitions promoted by Hindutva.
This is not only essential for well-known sites such as Sri Guru Dattatreya
Bababudan Swamy Dargah, Champaner and the Babri Masjid, but the simple fact
that India has a very large number of syncretic shrines (Burman 1996) can help to
counter the argument of intolerance and destruction. Where incorrect claims are
made about historical temple desecration, these need to be systematically
refuted.
There are also very many other sites of great importance in India across all
ages, which need to be better publicized, preserved and managed. The early
historic city of Sisupalgarh in Orissa is a good example of this, as it is an example
of an as yet poorly understood culture that possessed a high level of social
organization and economic development (Mohanty and Smith 2008, p. 11). It is by
excavating such sites that the diversity of India’s common past comes to light,
and they have the potential to take the public’s interest because they are both
monumental and accessible. An interview with the BBC illustrates this well,
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where after noting that it may have supported up to 25,000 inhabitants, the
excavation co-leader was quoted as saying: ‘The significance of this ancient city
becomes clear when one bears in mind the fact that the population of classical
Athens was barely 10,000’ (Sahu 2008). By placing the magnitude of the Indian
past into context, it should not be hard to encourage public interest in its
richness and diversity. Unfortunately, in this case due to a lack of funds and a
preference by the ASI to focus on other areas of Indian heritage, what would be
the highly visible remains of a city that would qualify for World Heritage status
are covered over at the end of each excavation season.
It is similarly important that regions of India that are currently under-studied
in Indian archaeology receive more attention. Often these areas share borders
with other countries and are more culturally varied, so they can add a lot to
knowledge of migration, trade and diversity. Examples are the Assam region in
the north-east, with its proximity to South-East Asia (Hazarika 2006), and Jammu
and Kashmir and Himalchal Pradesh in the north-west, close to Middle Asia where
researchers ‘. . . expect an avalanche of new research to change our view of
mankind’s first attempt at civilisation’ (Lawler 2007, p. 590). It is only by
studying the migrations and interactions between the various regions that a
complete picture of the past can be arrived at, in contrast to the more indigenous
models favoured by Hindu nationalists. Ratnagar (2004) has also stressed that
elements of cultural anthropology and ethnic archaeology are missing from
courses offered in Indian archaeology departments, something which would
better equip students for understanding ancient and non-Hindu sites, while
Bernbeck and Pollock (1996, p. S141) have argued that it is important to
demonstrate the way that both membership of communities and their identities
have changed over time, in order to refute the idea that they are unchanging and
that it is possible to equate a modern population directly with a past one. New
perspectives and methodologies are in fact developing within Indian archaeology
and history that have the potential to subvert the dominant research paradigms
and agendas. The employment of indigenous epistemological transitions has been
urged (Paddayya 1995), and the rise of subaltern studies promises to be more
inclusive of minorities and interpretations of their pasts. According to Prakash,
discussing the journal of the same name, the ‘. . . critical force of Subaltern
Studies lies in its disruption of such enduring colonialist and nationalist
essentializations as the unitary Indic civilization and the nation’ (Prakash 1992,
p. 373).
Finally and most importantly, archaeologists and historians need to become as
actively involved in education as possible, both of schoolchildren and the public.
Not only do they need to work hard to combat the attempts at misinformation
from right-wing nationalists, they also need to try to improve public knowledge
of the past, as well as their understanding of how archaeology, history and
science work, so that they can judge the information being presented to them in
the media. There are excellent programmes already underway in this regard,
such as that run by the Sharma Children’s Museum near Chennai, which teaches
children ‘introductory archaeology, associated sciences and ethnoarchaeology,
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the story of human evolution, cultural phases in India from the Palaeolithic to the
Iron Age’ as well as the archaeology of the local region (Pappu 2000, p. 485).
Equipped with knowledge such as this, as opposed to that which is learnt in the
Hindutva-organized Sanskrit camps, these children can face the future with both
an appreciation for the diversity of their own country, and an objective toolkit for
interpreting issues of identity and communalism. This is extremely encouraging,
and is exactly the kind of development that Paddayya has stressed as most
necessary in reference to the 1992 events at Ayodhya:
. . . a more mature response requires that, instead of bewailing this legacy of
British scholarship, Indians take concrete steps to educate society about the
past. Precious little has been done over the last forty-five years. The result is the
indiscriminate use of the past by interested groups for their own ends . . . A non-
partisan understanding of the past on the part of the ordinary citizen, and his/her
ability to appreciate the universality of human culture . . . are the best insurance
against any abuse of the past. (Paddayya 1995, pp. 141142)
This has also been identified by Sen as being the single most important way to
counter Hindutva:
The deepest weakness of contemporary Hindu politics lies, however, in its
reliance on ignorance at different levels*from exploiting credulity in order to
promote militant obscurantism to misrepresenting India’s past in order to foster
factional nationalism and communal fascism. The weakest link in the sectarian
chain is this basic dependence on both simple and sophisticated ignorance. That
is where a confrontation is particularly overdue. (Sen 1993, p. 22)
Consequences and Conclusion
The potential consequences of a continued rise of the Hindu right in India, with a
parallel leveraging of heritage to create identity based conflicts, should not be
underestimated, and archaeologists and historians can play a vital role by
nullifying this strategy. Following the Allahabad High Court verdict in favour of
the nationalists, a proliferation of demands that heritage sites all over India be
turned over to Hindu control can be expected, but as in the cases outlined in this
article, the human cost of the decision is not yet known.
While Hindu nationalism seeks to portray India as culturally homogenous, it is
at the same time highly divisive. It is possible that it could over time lead to an
India so fractured that the state would no longer be able sustain the process of
governing described by Arendt, and would either have to concede a greater
political role to more minorities, removing them from their stateless condition
and facing ever greater challenges in governing, or be faced with secession
movements in which they remove themselves. Greater autonomy for any of these
groups is likely in turn to lead to increased calls for a separate Hindu state. An
alternative would be, in opposition to Hindu nationalism, to take a non-sectarian
approach to nation-building with an emphasis on common strands of identity that
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would encourage minorities to remain within the state. In both cases, as seen in
the preceding sections, the use of heritage plays a highly significant role.
One year before the Babri Masjid demolition, Brass described both India and
the USSR as ‘. . . confronted by crises of national unity, including the expression of
explicit secessionist demands from several ethnic and nationality groups . . .’
(Brass 1991, p. 301). The USSR collapsed later that year, and since then it can be
argued that the continuing rise of right-wing nationalism in India has led to even
greater internal turmoil and instability. As a coherent opposition to Hindu
nationalism is yet to materialize and present an alternative identity and a vision
of an inclusive identity, this can be expected to continue.
According to Singh, the first half of the twenty-first century is likely to see
India facing major difficulties due to a necessary reorganization of its federal
structure. This is in part due to significant changes in population distribution,
where some states are coming to have very large populations but proportionally
fewer seats in parliament, and because of concerns about the financial and
administrative viability of some recently created states, and also the continuing
unresolved special status of both Kashmir and Nagaland. This is seen as necessary,
as the alternative of ‘. . . endless fragmentation of the Indian nation-state is not a
solution but part of the problem of ungovernability and international instability’
(Singh 2007, pp. 246247). In order to mitigate the risks involved in this
challenge, India will need to work to avoid the alienation of minorities by
addressing their concerns and attempting to establish a more inclusive national
identity.
Moves towards regional autonomy or secession would have serious conse-
quences for the entire South Asian region, especially as India is currently
surrounded by politically unstable and authoritarian states. Any granting of
autonomy in India could spark independence movements in neighbouring states
as well, such as Bhutan and Nepal, which both have significant minority
populations (Misra 2004), and change to the sovereignty of Kashmir would
aggravate relations with Pakistan. Internal disorder would also make it difficult
for India to respond to international conflict situations, as evidenced by its
recent reluctance to aid Sri Lanka in 2000 when its forces were already stretched
with dealing with problems in Kashmir and its north-east states (Devotta 2003).
India’s relations with both of its Muslim neighbours, Pakistan and Bangladesh,
are currently highly strained, and there is a danger that a Hindu nationalist
government pursuing anti-Muslim policies would cause these relations to
deteriorate still further. Pakistan is widely seen as the largest threat to security
in the region, both due to its support for militant Islam and its internal fragility,
compounded by the fact that it is a nuclear power (Vicziany and Weigold 2003,
p. 81). Should India not work towards lessening tensions and increasing trust this
situation is not likely to improve, especially as both India and Pakistan are likely
to come into conflict over developing interests in Central Asia, which are already
leading them into an increasingly long-term and aggressively competitive
involvement in Afghanistan (Pant 2010). The internal stability of Pakistan would
also be impacted, as increased Hindu nationalism in India is likely to encourage
216 HOLE
both an increase in militancy among civilian groups and the strengthening of the
position of the military itself, which has hardly proven itself a factor in promoting
stable democracy. In a situation of decreased trust, the consequences of another
‘strategic surprise’ such as the 2008 attacks on Mumbai could be much more
severe.
There is also the danger that, as has occurred in other countries, a nationalist
government in India might adopt an expansionist agenda. The ‘India Shining’
campaign of 2004 clearly indicated the BJP’s desire to both ally itself with
business and to project a more powerful international identity (Wyatt 2005).
Hindu nationalism has a history of international ambition that began with the
Greater India Society, founded in Calcutta in the 1920s, and sought to
demonstrate that Hindu civilization had both greatly influenced and to a degree
colonized other parts of Asia. This included cultural claims to a wide swathe of
territory, from Central Asia to the Pacific, including Tibet, Cambodia, Singapore,
Burma, Java, Bali, Vietnam, Ceylon and even Japan (Bayley 2004, p. 713). Their
work is now being picked up by Hindutva scholars, who lobby for increased
engagement with these countries and those which have large immigrant Hindu
populations such as Nepal, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines (Mitra 2003,
p. 411). According to Grant:
Hindu nationalists view their nation as possessing the greatest claim to
indigeneity for an area . . . of the Earth’s surface roughly equivalent to the official
state claim of modern India. This includes the disputed areas of Kashmir, Ladakh,
and Arunachal Pradesh. Nearby areas*including those claimed by Pakistan and
Bangladesh (as well as perhaps Sri Lanka, Tibet and Nepal) are understood to be
at their root part of this claim. (Grant 2005, p. 332)
As this article has argued, heritage is central to the pressing of this claim and it
is clear that archaeologists and historians have a chance to play a very important
role in determining the future of the Indian state, and of other states in the
region. With Hindu nationalism posing a serious threat to stability and not
showing signs of decline, it is vital to establish an effective opposition to it within
these disciplines. This needs to not only include the production of well-balanced
research, but must also carefully refute nationalist misinformation, and above all
focus on public education. There is a tendency to underestimate the danger
posed by the right, but it is only by determined and concerted action that this
danger can be negated.
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